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NOTES
GIVE ME LIBERTI OR GIVE ME SILENCE: TAKING A
STAND ON FIFTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS FOR
COURT-ORDERED THERAPY PROGRAMS
INTRODUCTION

[T] he Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination ... can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory; and it protects
against any disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be
used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that
might be so used. 1
Probation is frequently conditioned on the convicted criminal's
satisfactory completion of a rehabilitative therapy program. 2 A primary purpose of the criminal justice system is to protect the public by
discouraging recidivism in past offenders. 3 In theory, permanent incarceration best serves this purpose, because a person in jail cannot
commit another crime. 4 In the last century, however, the prison popKastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972) (footnotes omitted).
See Ann A. Holmes, Note, Alternative Sentencing in Alabama, 16 LAw & PsvcHOL. REv.
217, 221-22 (1992). Many courts use "intensive supervised probation," which involves increased observation and may be coupled with psychological counseling. See id.; see also Gail
Jones, The Use and Effectiveness of the Probation Order with a Condition for Psychiatric Treatment
in North Wales, 20 CAMBIUAN L. REv. 63 (1989) (noting that most commentators are enthusiastic about the use of court-ordered therapy programs).
1

2

This Note assumes that such therapy programs successfully curb recidivism. See CoMMITI'EE ON Gov'T PoLICY, GAP REPORT No. 137, FoRCED INTO TREATMENT: THE RoLE OF
CoERCION IN CLINICAL PRACTICE (1994) (noting the success of court-ordered therapy in a
number of contexts, including for sex offenders); Amicus Brief of American Professional
Society on the Abuse of Children Supporting Neither Party at 12, State v. Imlay, 813 P.2d
979 (Mont. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1260, cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 444 (1992) (No. 91687) [hereinafter APSAC Brief] (noting the significant difference in recidivism rates for
offenders who complete therapy versus those who do not participate); see also W.L. Marshall & H.E. Barbaree, Outcome of Comprehensive Cognitive-Behavioral Treatment Programs, in
HANDBOOK OF SEXUAL AssAULT: ISSUES, THEORIES, AND TRE!\.TMENT OF THE OFFENDER 363,
379 (W.L. Marshall eta!. eds., 1990) [hereinafter HANDBOOK OF SEXUAL AsSAULT] ("Outpatient treatment of sex offenders by cognitive-behavioral procedures ... seems to be effective."). But see Lita Furby eta!., Sex Offender Recidivism: A Review, 105 PSYCHOL BuLL 3, 27
(1989) (noting the difficulty of drawing conclusions from current studies).
3
See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusTIN W. Scorr, JR., CRIMINAL LAw 10 (2d ed.
1986) (discussing criminal law's goal of preventing harm to society).
4
This reasoning ignores the prevalence of crime in prison. See Hudson v. Palmer,
468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984) (giving statistics on crime in prison).
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ulation in the United States has increased dramatically. 5 Overcrowding in jails has forced law enforcement officials to seek alternatives to
incarceration. 6 Suspended sentences and probation provide such alternatives, and are often used for nondangerous offenders. 7 Probation, however, does not provide the same certainty of nonrecidivism as
incarceration does; 8 therefore, the increased use of probation has corresponded with an increase in court-ordered therapy. 9 In 1978, the
Supreme Court recognized that "[a]pproximately a century ago, areform movement assert[ed] that the purpose of"incarceration, and
therefore the guiding consideration in sentencing, should be rehabilitation of the offender." 10 This emphasis on rehabilitationii has had
enormous implications for the mental health profession. The most
i~portant consequence has been the growth and diversification of
therapy programs ranging from substance abuse counseling to family
group therapy to sex offender treatment programs. 12
5
See Holmes, supra note 2, at 217 (" [S]tate and federal prison populations have more
than tripled" in the past couple of decades.) See generally Benjamin Frank, The American
Prison: The End of an Era, 43 FED. PROBATION 3 (1979) (arguing that due to the population
increase, incarceration can no longer be the primary form of punishment)."
6
See Holmes, supra note 2, at 221-28; see also STEVEN R. SMITH & RoBERT G. MEYER;
LAw, BEHAVIOR, AND MENTAL HEALTH: POLICY AND PRACTICE 445-48 (1987.) (listing alternatives to incarceration).
7
See Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 272 (1943); ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAw
OF SENTENCING 52 (1978); Holmes, supra note 2, at 219.
8
See Holmes, supra note 2, at 221; see also Furby et al., supra note 2, at 3-4 (noting that
in states which emphasize rehabilitation "the prevailing view is that simple incarceration is
not a sufficient deterrent for sex offenders." However, because "the ovenvhelming majority of apprehended sex offenders are not incarcerated or institutionalized at all .... probation with mandated treatment ... is the most common disposition.").
9
See Furby et al., supra note 2, at 4 ("In response to the increa5ing demand for sex
offender treatment, there has been a proliferation of both public and private outpatient
programs.").
10
United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 46 (1978); see Carol A. Veneziano, Prison
Inmates and Consent to Treatment: Problems and Issues, 10 LAw & PSYCHOL. REv. 129, 130
(1986). See generally LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 3, at 23-26 (discussing different justifications for punishment and the current emphasis on rehabilitation).
11
In very recent years there has been a decline in the push toward rehabilitation as
the primary goal of the criminal justice system. This decline is due to the apparent lack of
results from rehabilitative programs and the high cost of administering therapy programs.
See, e.g., SMITH & MEYER, supra note 6, at 424-25;Justin Brooks, Addressing Recidivism: Legal
Education in Correctional Settings, 44 RuTGERS L. REv. 699, 702 n.6 (1992) (theorizing that
this shift has been prompted by the increase in drug-related crimes); see also Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TuL. L. REv. 1011 (1991) (criticizing the recent rejection of the rehabilitative model of punishment). This Note assumes that, regardless of this
shift, rehabilitation still plays a significant role in sentencing.
12
See generally HARoLD J. VETTER & LEONARD TERRITO, CRIME AND JusTICE IN AMERICA
475-81 (1984) (discussing addiction treatment and community correctional centers); Stanley L. Brodsky & Donald]. West, Life-Skills Treatment of Sex Offenders, 6 LAw & PSYCHOL. REv.
97 (1981) (comparing different forms of treatment for sexual offenders). The sex offender programs referred to in this Note do not treat violent sex crimes such as rape.
The expansion of these programs has resulted in a proliferation of new forms of treatment, often focusing less on a "cure" than on controlling symptoms. There is a growing
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The dramatic expansion of therapeutic sentencing alternatives
has disturbing implications for the Fifth Amendment rights of convicted offenders, because cooperation of the patient is a prerequisite
to successful therapy.l 3 Sex offenders, alcoholics, batterers and child
abusers often deny both the commission of an offense and the inappropriateness of their actions. 14 The first step toward rehabilitation,
however, is to admit that there is a problem. In criminal law, this
translates into an admission of guilt, raising the question of whether
the requirement of most therapy programs that a defendant accept
responsibility for his actions 15 violates the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. 1 6
To answer this question this Note first discusses a Montana case,
State v. Imlay, 17 which highlights one of the conflicts that arises between the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and
the need of the criminal justice system for effective rehabilitation.
Part II identifies the requirements of a basic Fifth Amendment claim.
Part III examines two examples of Fifth A.mendment balancing prior
to conviction. Additionally, it discusses various alternatives to the balancing approach which have been taken in termination of parental
rights cases by courts seeking to avoid the conflict between court-ordered therapy and the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Part IV explores the application of the Fifth Amendment in
the post sentencing phase of a criminal proceeding. This note proposes that a state's legitimate interest in compelling testimony for reasons other than amassing evidence for a criminal prosecution should
. be balanced against the defendant's interest in asserting the Fifth
Amendment privilege. After a verdict of guilty, this balancing may
belief among mental health professionals that sexual dysfunction such as child molestation
cannot be cured. Rather, the perpetrators can be taught to recognize signs of the problem
and control their impulses. The present psychological approach uses cognitive behavioral
therapy to prevent recidivism. See APSAC Brief, supra note 2, at 10-11; see also William D.
Pithers, Relapse Prevention with Sexual Aggressors, in HANDBOOK OF SEXUAL AssAULT, supra
note 2, at 343, 346 (discussing self-management skills of sex offenders as an alternative goal
of therapy); William D. Murphy, Assessment and Modification of Cognitive Distortions in Sex
Offenders, in HANDBOOK OF SEXUAL AssAULT, supra note 2, at 331 (describing self-modification training).
13
See, e.g., Marshall & Barbaree, supra note 2, at 374 (noting that men who refused to
participate in treatment because of a failure to admit guilt "recidivated at a rate that was, if
anything, slightly higher than the untreated admitters").
14
See APSAC Briet, mpra note 2, at 13; Jeffrey A. Klotz et al., Cognitive Restructuring
Through Law: A Therapeutic jurisprudence Approach to Sex Offenders and the Plea Process, 15 U.
PUGET SoUND L. REv. 579, 581 nn.7-9 (1992).
15
This Note uses the phrase "acceptance of responsibility" interchangeably with "admission of guilt."
16
The Fifth Amendment states in relevant part: "No person shall ... be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... " U.S. CoNST. amend. V.
17
813 P.2d 979 (Mont. 1991), cerl. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1260, cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct.
444 (1992).

1994]

NOTE-COURT-ORDERED THERAPY

703

come out in favor of lessening the extent of the constitutional protection with respect to particular inquiries. Finally, this Note analyzes the
requirements of rehabilitation schemes in the context of two recent
Supreme Court cases which show that the elements needed to trigger
a Fifth Amendment claim may be present in cases where the protection is not allowed to operate. 18 In such situations the government's
interest in imposing a requirement of therapy outweighs a defendant's interest in the Fifth Amendment protections.
I
THE CONFLICT IDENTIFIED

In State v. Imlay, 19 the District Court of Cascade County found the
defendant guilty of sexually abusing a minor and sentenced him to
five years in jai1. 20 The judge imposed a suspended sentence, conditioning Imlay's probation on the satisfactory completion of a therapy
program for sex offenders. 21 The therapy program required Imlay to
accept responsibility for his actions. When Imlay asserted his innocence, as he had throughout the trial, the therapist refused to pursue
treatment. 22 The state prosecutor's office then petitioned for revocation of the suspended sentence on the ground that Imlay had violated
the t.erms of his probation. 23
The district court revoked Imlay's probation and reinstated the
original five year sentence. 24 During the hearing, the court gathered
evidence from the directors of two sexual offender treatment programs.25 It found that no outpatient therapy program would accept a
person who refused to admit committing a sexual assault. Moreover,
the Montana State Prison ran the only available inpatient program. 26
The court determined that a repeat offense was improbable, but felt
constrained by the jury's guilty verdict and thus decided to revoke Imlay's probation. 27
18 This Note draws a distinction between the availability of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and its applicability. Thus, there are some situations that
meet the requisite criteria for triggering the privilege, but, because the balance of interests
comes out in the government's favor, the constitutional protection is limited.
19 813 P.2d 979 (Mont. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1260, cert. dismissed, ll3 S. Ct.
444 (1992).
20 !d. at 980.
21 !d. at 981.
22 !d.
23 Joint Appendix at 24, State v. Imlay, 813 P.2d 979 (Mont. 1991), cert. granted, ll2 S.
Ct. 1260, cert. dismissed, ll3 S. Ct. 444 (1992) [hereinafter Joint Appendix].
24 !d. at 36.
25 !d. at 34-35.
26 !d. at 35.
27 !d. at 36.
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The Montana Supreme Court vacated the sentence and remanded the case to the district court, holding that the Fifth Amendment prohibits increasing a defendant's sentence for his refusal to
confess his guilt. 28 The State of Montana, joined by seventeen other
states, petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari on the ground that
the Fifth Amendment was not applicable because there was no further
threat of prosecution. 29 In response, Imlay claimed that he feared a
criminal prosecution for perjury and that the district court had penalized him for exercising his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate
himself. 30 This Note argues that the decision of the Montana
Supreme Court is erroneous. Although the court correctly held that
Fifth Amendment protections are available in the probationary context, it erred in assessing the specific application of those protections.
II
REQUIREMENTS FOR A FIFTH AMENDMENT CLAIM

The Fifth Amendment has its origins in the English common
law, 31 from which it was later incorporated into the American Bill of
Rights. The framers, "[w]hile deeply committed to perpetuating a system that minimized the possibilities of convicting the innocent, ...
were not less concerned about the humanity that the fundamental law
28
Imlay, 813 P.2d at 985. On remand, the district court resentenced Imlay to five
years in prison, noting that, had it known of Imlay's unacceptability into a therapy program, it would not have allowed a suspended sentence in the first place. Joint Appendix,
supra note 23, at 41.
29
See Amicus Brief Submitted by the State of Vermont on Behalf of the States of
Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey,
North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah and Virginia in
Support of Petitioner, Imlay, 813 P.2d 979 (Mont. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1260, cert.
dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 444 (1992) (No. 91-687) [hereinafter Brief of States in Support of
Petitioner]. The American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children filed a brief supporting neither party. APSAC Brief, supra note 2. Additionally, the United States Department of Justice flied a brief on behalf of the petitioner.
30
Brief for Respondent, at 9-10 Imlay, 813 P.2d 979 (Mont. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S.
Ct. 1260, cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 444 (1992). The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
heard oral arguments in the case. However, it later concluded that any opinion it would
render would be merely advisory and that the petition should have been dismissed. Montana v. Imlay, 113 S. Ct. 444 (1992) (dismissal of certiorari because improvidently granted).
Mr. Imlay would either be released on parole, or serve his complete sentence regardless of
the decision of the United States Supreme Court; thus a ruling would not have a substantive impact on the rights of either party. See id. at 444-45 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice
White dissented from the decision, claiming that the importance of the issue, and the
conflict among the lower courts, mandated a consideration of the case. Id. at 445 (White,
J., dissenting).
31
See genlffally LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 368 (1968); WAYNE R. LAFAVE &jEROLD H. IsRAEL, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1992). At English common law, there was an oath ex officio stating
"nemo teneture seipsum prodm" (no man is bound to produce himself). When the Bill of
Rights incorporated the maxim, it varied the language to cover any forced self-incrimination. See id. at § 8.14.
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should show even to the offender." 32 Thus, the protections found in
the Fifth Amendment are meant to apply to the guilty and the
innocent.
Several concerns guide the application of the Fifth Amendment.
The Supreme Court, in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 33 listed a
number of these considerations:
our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel
trilemma of self-accusation, peijury or contempt; our preference for
an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by
inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play ... ; our
respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the
right of each individual [to privacy] ... ; our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the privilege, while sometimes "a shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection to the
innocent. "34

This does not mean, however, that the Fifth Amendment is an absolute right. The courts have never interpreted the amendment to prevent the use of nontestimonial incriminating evidence or voluntary
statements. 35 Once a court establishes that the Fifth Amendment is
implicated in a particular situation, the court must still determine the
extent of its protection. This Note proposes that such a determination should take into account the various policies behind the amendment and balance the individual's interest against the government's. 36
In some situations, such as the preconviction context, the balance wi1l
strongly favor applying the full protection afforded by the Fifth
Amendment. 37 After a verdict of guilty, however, full protection may
32

supra note 31, at 432.
378 U.S. 52 (1964).
34
!d. at 55 (quoting Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 (1955)) (footnotes
omitted). The first concern observes the importance of not presenting a defendant with an
impossible choice; the second reflects the type of system our society favors; the third recognizes the possible abuses of police power; the fourth concern notices that the unequal
balance of power in favor of the government would lead many defendants to plead guilty
in order to avoid harsh penalties (Plea bargaining, although it raises these same concerns,
is now allowed in recognition of its usefulness in the settlement of cases without trial.
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978)); the fifth recognizes an individual's right to
privacy; the sixth focuses on the fear of false guilty pleas; and the seventh is an acknowledgment that our society views "the determination of guilt or innocence by just procedures" to
be "more important than punishing the guilty." LEw, supra note 31, at 432.
35
See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304-05 (1985).
36
See discussion infra part IV.
37 A court may be able to balance in the presentencing context; however, the individual's interest in most cases will be so strong as to override the government's interest.
Although the analysis in this Note is applicable to the presentencing situation, there are
different considerations at various stages in the trial process. Accordingly, this Note concentrates on the application of a balancing test to the postsentencing phase of a criminal
trial.
33

LEVY,
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not apply, and the court can weigh the scope of the Amendment
against society's interest in a workable criminal justice system. 38
A.

Incrimination

The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination has two
parts. 39 First, it guarantees every person the right to remain silent
when faced with a reasonable fear of incrimination in a later criminal
proceeding. Second, it protects against the use of statements that are
the result of governmental coercion. This section focuses on the first
part of the privilege against self-incrimination. The following section
addresses the exclusion of coerced testimony.

1.

Real Fear of Incrimination

For the privilege against self-incrimination to attach, the risk of
future incrimination must not merely present " 'imaginary and insubstantial' hazards of incrimination," but "rather ... 'real and appreciable' risks." 40 If the risk is too speculative, the Fifth Amendment's
protections do not apply. 41 The requirement that the fear not be imaginary focuses on the risk of incrimination, not prosecution. Prosecution need only be possible; it does not actually have to happen, nor
does it have to result in a conviction. 42 Furthermore, the amendment
"does not distinguish degrees of incrimination. "43 Thus, if the fear of
incrimination is real but minor, the amendment's protections apply.
Although the right against self-incrimination applies to defendants in all proceedings, the resulting incrimination must relate to a
criminal charge. Because a probation revocation hearing is not a
criminal proceeding, the Fifth Amendment does not protect against
the use of coerced statements at such hearings, nor is a person privileged to remain silent when her only fear is revocation of probation. 44
See discussion infra part IV.
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
40
Minor v. United States, 396 U.S. 87, 98 (1969) (deciding that the risk presented by
the registration requirement for narcotics dealers was not substantial because it was unlikely that illegal sales would be recorded).
41
Id. at 98.
42
Minor's fear was unreasonable because the fear of incrimination was not realistic.
Minor, 396 U.S. at 93. If the incriminating statements were likely to be recorded, the Fifth
Amendment would apply whether or not the government tended to prosecute the offense.
This distinction becomes important later in the context of Imlay--even though the government may not often bring prosecutions for perjury based upon evidence acquired during
therapy, the fear of incrimination is still real and substantial. See infra part IV.B.2.
43
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966).
44
See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973). In Gagnon, the defendant was
arrested for burglary while on probation. His probation was revoked without a hearing.
The Court held that, although Mr. Scarpelli was entitled to a hearing under the same
conditions as required for the revocation of parole in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972), such a hearing is not considered a criminal proceeding. The Court emphasized
38

39
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A probationer, nevertheless, may fear further criminal prosecution for
the activities resulting in the revocation of probation. Consequently,
the Supreme Court has held that:
[t]he Amendment not only protects the individual against being involuntarily called as a witness against himself in a criminal prosecution but also privileges him not to answer official questions put to
him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal,
· where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal
proceedings. 45

The following analysis focuses on the postsentencing context and
addresses two concerns: the right to remain silent in the face of questions related to the original criminal charge, and questions related to
a separate criminal charge.
a.

Fear of incrimination related to the original criminal prosecution

Questions put to a postconviction, pre-appeal defendant about
the crime for which she was convicted raise FifLh A_mendment concerns. The Double Jeopardy Clause46 prohibits a second trial for a
single crime, so there is no fear of another, identical criminal prosecution.47 The convicted defendant, however, may still seek postconviction relief and therefore fear incrimination after the conclusion of the
initial trial. 48 In United States v. DiFrancesco49 the Supreme Court noted
that a jury verdict of not guilty is final, although the pronouncement of
a sentence is not. 50 A conviction is final when the time for appeal has
elapsed and a petition for certiorari either has been denied or no
longer can be brought on the issue. 51 Therefore, when tl1e questions
relate to the original criminal prosecution, a criminal whose conviction is deemed final is not privileged to remain silent. 52
the "informal nature of the proceedings and the absence of technical rules of procedure
or evidence." Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786-87. Additionally, the hearing board is not in the role
of a judge focusing on factlinding and punishment, but is concerned instead with the
rehabilitative needs of the offender. !d. at 787-88.
45
Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973).
46 U.S. CoNST. amend. V ("[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... ").
47
See, e.g., United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-48 (1989) (holding that a later
civil proceeding can violate the clause if the judgment serves as a penalty rather than mere
restitution).
48
Such relief may take the form of a direct appeal, a motion for a second trial based
upon new evidence, or a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
49
449 U.S. 117 (1980).
50
!d. at 132.
51
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321 n.6 (1987) (citing United States v.Johnson,
457 U.S. 537, 542 n.8 (1982)).
52
If the questions would incriminate the defendant in another charge, then he would
be privileged to remain silent. Alternatively, if the inquiries focus only on actions for
which he has already been tried, there would be no possibility of further prosecution, and
thus no fear of incrimination.
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Even before the convicted criminal has exhausted all avenues of
appeal, the state can impose a sentence. 53 At this point it is the
defendant who must weigh the risks and benefits of remaining silent-the burden switches to him to show his innocence.5 4 The Fifth
Amendment allows a defendant to remain silent before a conviction is
final, but it does not allow a person to escape a valid sentence. Thus,
a convicted criminal may not avoid a particular sentence by maintaining his innocence and claiming that the protection afforded by the
Fifth Amendment excuses his lack of proof. 55 This does not mean
that a state can penalize a defendant for continued silence. It means
that the state can impose an appropriate sentence for the crime. In
those cases where the Fifth Amendment protects a defendant's silence, the state can still compel statements by granting immunity from
their use.
b.

Fear of incrimination related to a separate criminal charge

A more difficult Fifth Amendment problem is presented when a
convicted criminal fears prosecution for a separate criminal charge.
For example, in a probation revocation proceeding, a prosecutor
might ask the defendant questions relating to a crime, such as burglary, which she was suspected of committing while on probation.
Her answers to the questions may result not only in the revocation of
probation, but also in a separate criminal prosecution for burglary.
However, a convicted defendant retains some Fifth Amendment protection. For example, in Minnesota v. Murphy, 56 the Court stated:
A defendant does not lose [the] protection [of the Fifth Amend-

ment] by reason of his conviction of a crime; notwithstanding that a
defendant is imprisoned or on probation at the time he makes incriminating statements, if those statements are compelled they are
inadmissible in a subsequent trial for a crime other than that for
which he has been convicted. 57
53 Some sentences are stayed pending appeal, for example, death sentences. In other
situations, however, the government's interest in protecting the public allows the state to
incarcerate a defendant who is waiting to appeal.
54
See, e.g., Delo v. Lashley, 113 S. Ct 1222, 1226 (1993) ("Once the defendant has
been convicted fairly in the guilt phase of the trial, the presumption of innocence disappears."). This is not to say that the government no longer has the burden to prove that the
process was valid. Appeals which result in acquittal on a technicality are not proceedings
to determine guilt or innocence. Although a defendant has to prove innocence after a
verdict of guilty, the government still has the responsibility of showing that the verdict was
obtained after a constitutionally valid trial.
55 See United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 758 (1983) (observing that the Fifth
Amendment "has never been thought to be in itself a substitute for evidence that would
assist in meeting a burden of [proof]").
56
465 u.s. 420 (1984).
57 !d. at 426.
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Because a convicted criminal does not lose all claims to the protections of the Fifth Amendment, if a state wishes to elicit answers relating to separate criminal activity, it must provide immunity from
subsequent prosecution. This is the clearest application of the Fifth
Amendment in the postconviction context.
In many cases, however, the inquiries are not this straightforward.
For example, a court may impose general conditions of probation instead of requiring answers to specific questions that relate to guilt.
The purpose of these conditions is not to amass evidence for a later
criminal prosecution, but to facilitate rehabilitation. Although such
conditions may lead to future incrimination, they are not impermissible.58 Requirements that a convicted criminal reveal financial information,59 answer his probation officer truthfully, 60 or successfully
complete a therapy program 5 1 are examples of general probation conditions that the courts have upheld as constitutional even though such
conditions might reveal incriminating evidence.62

2.

Fear of Prosecutions for Perjury: Beyond the Scope of Immunity
Statutes

Immunity statutes provide "a reconciliation of the well-recognized policies behind the privilege of self-incrimination ... , and the
need of the State, as well as the Federal Government, to obtain information 'to assure the effective functioning of government.' "63 They
allow the government to compel a person to speak, but prevent the
use of the statements in future prosecutions. Courts construe the im. munity broadly: 64 it should "in all respects commensurate with the
protection guaranteed by the constitutional limitation." 65 In other
words, statements which would have been excluded under the Fifth
Amendment must also be excluded when elicited under a grant of
immunity.
One potential problem in this area involves prosecutions for perjury. Immunity statutes do not apply to prosecutions for perjury, the
58 See discussion infra part IV.
59 United States v. Pierce, 561 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1977),

cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923

(1978).

60 Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984).

See discussion infra part IV.B.l.
State v. Imlay, 813 P.2d 979 (Mont. 1991), cert. granted, ll2 S. CL 1260, cert. dismissed, ll3 S. Ct. 444 ( 1992). See discussion infra part IV.B.2.
62 This Note deals with these situations in more detail in part IV infra.
63 Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 81 (1973) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 93 (1964) (White,]., concurring)).
64 See, e.g., Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507 (1960); Ullmann v. United States, 350
U.S. 422 (1956), averruled by Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
65 Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139, 141 (l9ll). See also New Jersey v. Portash,
440 U.S. 450, 453 (1979) (holding that the immunity granted by state statutes "must be at
least coextensive with the privilege afforded by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments").
61
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rationale being that the courts have an inherent power to punish false
testimony. 5 6 This does, in fact, comport with the Constitution because
the Fifth Amendment does not entitle a defendant to lie, but merely
protects him if he chooses to remain silent. 5 7 If a defendant chooses
to speak, "[t]he interests of the other party and regard for the function
of courts of justice to ascertain the truth become relevant, and prevail
in the balance of considerations determining the scope and limits of
the privilege against self-incrimination." 68 In United States v. Apfelbaum,69 the Supreme Court noted that the federal immunity statute's
express exception allowing prosecutions for perjury70 did not violate
the Fifth Amendment. 71 The Court interpreted the privilege as not
protecting against proceedings to substantiate charges of perjury. 72
Moreover, the Court held that enhancing a sentence for willful perjury during trial does not violate the Fifth Amendment. 73 The Court
has stated that "a defendant who commits a crime and then perjures
herself in an unlawful attempt to avoid responsibility is more threaten66

Glickstein, 222 U.S. at 141.

67

See United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 {1969). Knox was charged with making false

statements on his wagering registration form. The Court held that despite the fact that the
Fifth Amendment would bar the use of truthful statements in the registration in a later
criminal prosecution, ·it would not protect falsehoods. /d. at 82.
68 Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980) (quoting Brown v. United States, 356
U.S. 148, 156 (1958)).
69
445 u.s. 115 (1980).
70
18 u.s.c. § 6002 (1988).
71
Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. at 126.
72
/d. See generally 70 CJ.S. Perjury§ 32 (1987) (discussing that there is no "right" to
commit perjury).
73
United States v. Dunnigan, 113 S. Ct. llll (1993) (holding that the trial court may
enhance sentence of a defendant convicted of a drug-related offense for willful pexjury
that occurred when the defendant testified in her own defense). The Supreme Court emphasized that the district court must make specific findings to support all elements of a
perjury violation. See id. at 1118. No standard, however, was articulated to determine the
sufficiency of the evidence. It appears to be possible for the trial court to simply rest on
the same evidence which was used to convict the defendant on the original charge. In
other words a defendant who claims innocence under oath can be convicted of perjury
simply on the basis that the verdict was guilty. Previous cases had held that the privilege
mandates that a sentence cannot be augmented because of an unsubstantiated belief that a
defendant committed perjury. See, e.g., Poteet v. Fauver, 517 F.2d 393 (3rd Cir. 1975);
Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
This approach appears to place more weight on the need of the criminal system to
prevent false testimony than the individual's right to testify on his or her own behalf. Because a defendant convicted of another offense may have his sentence enhanced based on
a claim of peijury simply because the final verdict in the case is guilty, defendants may be
less likely to testify on the their own behalf. This is an example of balancing the Fifth
Amendment protections against society's interest in an effective criminal system. See discussion infra parts III & IV. Although this Note focuses on the government's interest in
rehabilitation, Dunnigan seems to allow other objectives of the criminal system, such as the
need for truthful testimony, to take precedence over the protections afforded by the Fifth
Amendment.
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ing to society and less deserving of leniency than a defendant who
does not so defy the trial process."74
In summary, a defendant must establish the existence of a real
fear of criminal incrimination for the first part of the Fifth Amendment privilege to apply. The adequacy of this fear may depend on
whether the incrimination is related to the original criminal charge or
to a different prosecution. When the government grants immunity,
the fear is extinguished and the Fifth Amendment does not apply because statements made under the grant cannot be used against the
person in a criminal prosecution. However, if a person previously has
made statements under oath, subsequent inconsistent statements,
even if made under a grant of immunity, can be used in a criminal
prosecution for peijury.
B.

Exclusion of Coerced Testimony

The second part of the privilege against self-incrimination prevents the use of statements acquired through governmental compulsion. 75 The amendment's protections are not applicable to voluntary
statements and are generally not self-executing-they must be asserted.76 There is no need for a knowing and intelligent waiver in
most cases. 77 In some situations, however, the mere failure to claim
the privilege does not constitute a waiver. In these cases, special circumstances lead the courts to assume that compulsion is present and
to allow defendants automatic immunity from the use of the statements in later prosecutions. The following three sections discuss situ~
ations in which the Fifth Amendment protections are self-executing.

1.

Incrimination by Assertion of the Privilege

When the claim of the privilege itself would result in incrimination, the courts treat the privilege as self-executing. In Hoffman v.
United States, 78 the Supreme Court held that "[t]o sustain the privilege,
it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the
setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or
an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result." 79 This situation is most evident in the context of federal income and excise taxation of gamblers.
The mere act of refusing to file a tax return and claiming the privilege
Dunnigan, 113 S. Ct. at 1118.
See Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 653 (1976).
See United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1970) (holding that a person can lose
the privilege simply by failing to claim it).
77 See id.
78
341 u.s. 479 (1951).
79 !d. at 486-87.
74

75
76
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incriminates the taxpayer. Consequently, the Court has held that
merely failing to file triggers Fifth Amendment protections. 80
The privilege does not apply, however, when the government has
a legitimate regulatory interest, unrelated to a criminal prosecution,
in compelling information. For example, in California v. ByerS3 1 the
Supreme Court determined that a California statute requiring all automobile drivers involved in an accident to stop and provide basic
identifying information does not violate the Fifth Amendment. 82 The
Court found that divulging one's name and address is not sufficiently
incriminating to invoke the Fifth Amendment's protection.83 The
Court also noted that the statute was regulatory, not criminal, in nature and thus did not implicate the constitutional protection. 84 The
Court stated that "tension between the State's demand for disclosures
and the protection of the right against self-incrimination . . . must be
resolved in terms of balancing the public need . . . and the individual
claim." 85

2.

Custodial Interrogation

The Fifth Amendment protections are also self-executing in certain cases of "custodial i11terrogation." For example, Miranda v. Arizonaf36 established procedural safeguards for defendants who are
questioned while in police custody. 87 The Supreme Court concluded
that under the psychological pressures of interrogation during custody, suspects may provide statements they would otherwise have refused to fumish. 88 Therefore, in such contexts, suspects must be told
of their constitutional rights. Statements made in the absence of such
80 See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S.
62 (1968); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968). SeegenerallyJoseph N. Laplante,
Note, Self Incrimination on Incame Tax Returns: A Compelling Dilemma, 43 TAX LAw. 225
(1989) (identifying difficulties with the current system).
81
402 U.S. 424 (1971).
82
See id.
83 Jd. at 431.
84 I d. at 430. This is an example of pre-indictment balancing. See discussion infra part
III.
85 Id. at 427.
86
384 U.S. 436 (1966). A full analysis of Miranda, and the jurisprudence surrounding
it, is beyond the scope of this Note.
87 Prior to Miranda, the courts inquired as to whether a statement was voluntary or
involuntary. See Yale Kamisar, A Dissent fram the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the
"New" Fifth Amendment and the "Old" Voluntariness Test, 65 MicH. L. REv. 59 (1966) (asserting
the ineffectiveness and unworkability of the old voluntariness test). See generally 2 LAFAVE &
IsRAEL, supra note 31, at§ 6.2 (1992) (discussing the test for voluntariness).
The Supreme Court set out the standard for voluntariness in Procunier v. Atchley, 400
U.S. 446, 453 (1971). Although Miranda now covers many Fifth Amendment situations,
the voluntariness standard is still applicable outside the custodial context. See, e.g.,
Withrow v. Williams 113 S. Ct. 1745 (1993); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
88
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448-49.
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warnings may not be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution. 89 Investigators must provide such warnings whenever a person's "freedom
of action is curtailed in any significant way." 90 Once outside the police setting, however, the parameters of the exception are unclear.
Later cases have narrowed the holding in Miranda, 91 and the Supreme
Court has been reluctant to expand its scope into the probationary
context. 92
3.

The Penalty Situations

The final situation in which a court will presume compulsion occurs when a person is given a choice between either exercising the
Fifth Amendment privilege and being penalized, or waiving the privilege and incriminating himself. Not all sanctions are considered penalties for Fifth Amendment purposes. The Supreme Court in Garrity
v. New jersey93 held that civil sanctions are enough to trigger Fifth
Amendment protection-the question is simply whether the defendant has been deprived ofhis free choice to admit, deny or refuse to
answer. 94 In Lefkowitz v. Turley95 the Court stated that a "waiver secured under threat of substantial economic sanction cannot be
termed voluntary." 96 The Supreme Court has also found the threat of
loss of employment to be a penalty. 97
In Thomas v. United States, 98 the Fifth Circuit held that increasing
a defendant's sentence because he would not plead guilty is a penalty
and violates the Constitution. 99 Mter pronouncing a guilty verdict,
the sentencing judge gave the defendant an ultimatum: he could confess to the crime and possibly face a reduced sentence, or he could
maintain his innocence and face the maximum sentence for bank robbery.100 Thomas refused to confess and the court imposed the maxiSee id.
/d. at 467.
91
See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 651 (1984) (establishing the "public
safety exception" to Miranda and noting that "overriding considerations of public safety
[can]justuy [an] officer's failure to provide Miranda warnings"); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446
U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980) (defining interrogation as "express questioning or its functional
equivalent"); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (allowing a defendant to waive his
constitutional rights after only a partial warning).
92
See discussion infra part N.B.l.
93
385 U.S. 493 (1967).
94
See id. (finding application of Fifth Amendment rights in case in which police officers convicted of conspiracy were given the choice either to incriminate themselves or to
forfeit their jobs).
95
414 U.S. 70 (1973).
96 !d. at 82-83.
97
See Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Comm 'r of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280 ( 1968).
98
368 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1966).
99
/d. at 946.
100
/d. at 942.
89

90
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mum sentence. 101 In holding the district court's actions
unconstitutional, the Fifth Circuit pointed out that "Thomas had not
been finally and irrevocably adjudged guilty." 10 2 Thus, if he confessed, he would have been hurting his chances of success on appeal.
The choice between either maintaining his innocence or receiving a
lighter sentence violated the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights.
Ten years later, in United States v. Wright, 103 the same court reaffirmed
this idea, stating that "[a] defendant does not lose his right to appeal
or to continue to assert his innocence simply because the verdict of
the jury is guilty." 104
The majority of other circuits follow the Thomas court's reasoning, holding that a threat to increase a defendant's sentence if he will
not admit his guilt is unconstitutional. 105 The Ninth Circuit in Gollaher v. United States, 106 however, declined to follow the rationale of
Thomas and applied a balancing test, 107 emphasizing the importance
of rehabilitation over the defendant's right to maintain his innocence
after conviction. 108 The court reasoned that when a criminal is unwilling to take the first step toward rehabilitation-acceptance of responsibility-the judge may impose a stricter sentence.l 09
Almost twenty years later, in United States v. Mourning, no the Fifth
Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing Guideline's
two point reduction for "acceptance of responsibility."lll For each
!d.
!d. at 945.
103
533 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1976).
104
!d. at 216.
105
See, e.g., United States v. Kovic, 830 F.2d 680, 691 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 1044 (1988); United States v. Espinosa, 771 F.2d 1382, 1404 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1023 (1985); United States v. Roe, 670 F.2d 956, 973 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 856 (1982); United States v. DiRusso, 535 F.2d 673, 674 (1st Cir. 1976); United
States v. Coke, 404 F.2d 836, 847 (2d Cir. 1968).
106
419 F.2d 520 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960 (1969).
107
See discussion infra part IV for a more detailed analysis of the application of a balancing test after conviction.
108
See Gollaher, 419 F.2d at 530.
109
!d. A defendant who admits guilt is a better candidate for rehabilitation than one
who refuses to accept responsibility for his actions. See supra note 13 and accompanying
text.
110
914 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1990).
111
!d. at 705-07 (discussing U.S. SENTENCING Cotvuvt'N GumEUNES MANuAL § 3El.l
(1989) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]. Although the circuits agree about the constitutionality of
§ 3El.1, they do not agree as to its application. The First, Second and Ninth Circuits hold
that a defendant need only accept responsibility as to the offenses charged. However, the
Fourth, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits hold that the sentencing court has discretion to take
into account all of the circumstances in determining the defendant's acceptance of responsibility. See Kinder v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2290 (1992) (White,]. dissenting from denial
of certiorari) (identifying the conflict between the circuits); United States v. Frierson, 945
F.2d 650 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1515 (1992); United States v. O'Neil, 936
F.2d 599 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Oliveras, 905 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1990); United
States v. Gordon 895 F.2d 932 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 846 (1990); United States v.
101

102
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crime, the guidelines provide for the calculation of a base. offense
level. 112 A court may then consider aggravating and mitigating factors
and adjust the offense level accordingly. 113 In practice there is no substantive difference between penalizing a defendant for maintaining
his innocence by refusing to reduce his sentence and rewarding a defendant who accepts responsibility by indirectly decreasing his prison
term. 114 When trying to make a distinction, courts often focus on the
purpose of sentencing, noting the difference between actions engaged in for deterrent or rehabilitative purposes and those used as
punitive measures. 115 If the purpose of sentencing is exclusively retributive, there is no reason to lighten a criminal's sentence for accepting responsibility.I 16 If the purpose of sentencing is at least
partially rehabilitative, however, courts should consider the criminal's
acceptance of responsibility in determining the sentence. 117
The emphasis in the postsentencing context should not be on the
penalty-leniency distinction. The availability of the Fifth Amendment
in a particular circumstance should depend instead upon the purpose
of the action or inquiry that raised constitutional concerns. This
should diminish the number of inconsistencies generated by the penalty-leniency line and clarify the application of the privilege. When a
court imposes an increased sentence as a punitive measure it is likely
to violate the Fifth Amendment. In contrast, when the court's reasons
for varying the length of incarceration are related to rehabilitative or
o_ther legitimate goals of the criminal system besides punishment, the
Mourning, 914 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Gonzalez, 897 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir.
1990); United States v. Rogers, 921 F.2d 975 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 839 (1990);
See also United States v. Henry, 883 F.2d 1010 (11th Cir. 1989).
112
See U.S.S.G. § 3El.l.
113
See id.
114
See john C. Coffee, Jr., "Twisting Slowly in the Wind": A Search for Constitutional Limits
on Coercion of the Criminal Defendant, 1980 SuP. CT. REv. 211, 218 (questioning whether
leniency can be distinguished from a penalty in the Fifth Amendment context).
115
See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448-49 (1989) (holding that a subsequent
civil prosecution can violate the Double Jeopardy Clause when the proceedings are not
designed to be remedial but seek to impose punitive sanctions instead); Allen v. Illinois,
478 U.S. 364 (1986) (distinguishing between information gathered for therapeutic purposes and that used for a criminal prosecution); Agustin v. Quem, 611 F.2d 206, 211 (7th
Cir. 1979) (holding that the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws only applies to the imposition of punishment, and because laws designed to protect the public are
not punitive, they are not barred). The Fifth Amendment itself draws a distinction between civil and criminal prosecutions, the former being primarily restitutionary and the
latter involving punitive measures.
Section 3El.l 's purpose is to recognize "the increased potential for rehabilitation
among those who feel and show true remorse." United States v. Belgard, 694 F. Supp. 1488,
1497 (D. Or. 1988), affd sub nom., United States v. Summers, 895 F.2d 615 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 959 (1990).
116
See generally LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 3, at 25-27 (discussing theory of
retribution).
117 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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defendant's constitutional protections should be balanced against the
government's interest. This model concedes that the sentencing differences which result from a defendant's acceptance or denial of responsibility create coercive pressures. Yet such compulsion cannot be
thought to always violate the Fifth Amendment, because a workable
criminal system must be able to take into account a defendant's suitability for rehabilitation.

III
BALANCING THE FIFTH AMENDMENT IN THE PRECONVICTION
CoNTEXT

This Part analyzes preconviction situations in which Fifth Amendment concerns are implicated, but the courts have held that there is
no violation of the privilege. By examining preconviction situations in
which the courts have engaged in implicit balancing, this Note shows
that the application of the Fifth Amendment is not absolute. This
Note also argues that the courts should apply a balancing test which
takes into account both society's interest in maintaining effective law
enforcement and the individual's interest in applying the Fifth
Amendment privilege.
Although it did not list specific factors to be considered, the
Supreme Court explicitly referred to the use of a balancing test in two
Fifth Amendment cases. In Lefkowitz v. Turley 118 the Court recognized
the state's strong interest in questioning its employees, but noted that
"claims of overriding interests are not unusual in Fifth Amendment
litigation and they have not fared well." 119 Five years later in New jersey
v. Portash, 12° the Court held that balancing was impermissible in cases
in which testimony was given in response to a guarantee of immunity.121 Despite these comments, the Court has not completely refuted the application of a balancing test. This Note argues that
although the courts have not explicitly used a balancing test in conjunction with the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, they have done so implicitly. 122 This section identifies cases in
which courts have weighed the relevant concerns and allowed Fifth
Amendment protections to yield to societal interests in effective law
enforcement.
414 u.s. 70 (1973).
Id. at 78.
120 440 u.s. 450 (1979).
121 ld. at 459. The Court held that because the situation involved "the constitutional
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination in its most pristine form," it was inappropriate to consider the government's interest in using the compelled testimony. ld.
122 See infra part III.B.4.
118

119
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There are two situations where courts have balanced Fifth
Amendment concerns in the presentencing, and even preconviction,
context: in permitting the use of guilty pleas, and in determining the
constitutionality of court-ordered therapy programs in cases involving
the termination of parental rights. These situations demonstrate that
the privilege against self-incrimination is not absolute. Even in the
preconviction context, in which the defendant has a strong interest in
avoiding self-incrimination, courts have been willing to balance the
individual's interest against the public interest in maintaining an effective criminal justice system. The courts' willingness to balance in
preconviction cases lends strong support for balancing in postconviction cases.
A

Guilty Pleas and Plea Bargaining

In Brady v. United States, 123 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of guilty pleas. Justice White, writing for the majority,
stated, " [w] e decline to hold ... that a guilty plea is compelled and
invalid under the Fifth Amendment whenever motivated by the defendant's desire to accept the certainty or probability of a lesser penalty."124 The Court reasoned that a defendant who chooses to go to
trial does not face a greater sentence merely because he refused to
plead guilty-he simply faces the punishment legally imposed for the
crime of which he is found guilty. It is not unconstitutional for the
state to extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn extends a substantial benefit to the government and who demonstrates by his plea that
he is willing to admit his crime and to enter the correctional system in
a frame of mind that affords hope for successful rehabilitation in a
shorter period than might otherwise be necessary.I2 5
In coming to this conclusion, the Supreme Court, although it did
not explicitly refer to the use of a balancing test, determined that certain interests outweighed the Fifth Amendment privilege prior to conviction. For example, the state's interest in facilitating rehabilitation
and avoiding the expense of a full trial are sufficient to justify encouraging a guilty plea, despite the potential for unfair pressure on the
defendant. Balancing such as this in the preconviction stage provides
strong support for the use of a balancing test in the postconviction
setting when a defendant has already been found guilty.

123
124
125

397

u.s.

742 (1970).

!d. at 751.
!d. at 753.
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Therapy as a Condition of Family Reunification

Unlike defendants in the plea bargaining context, parents whose
children are removed from their custody by the state usually have not
been indicted on criminal charges. In many child abuse and neglect
actions, courts order the parents to complete therapy programs.
Regaining custody of the children is predicated upon successful completion of the program, during which the parents must accept responsibility for their actions. 126 Because these civil custody cases may lead
to future criminal prosecution, parents may fear the use in a criminal
child abuse trial of statements they made during therapy. The state
courts which have addressed this issue have reacted in different ways.

1.

The California Approach: Privileging Therapist-Patient
Communications

The first alternative, followed by Lh.e California Court of Appeals
in In Re Eduardo A., 127 is to hold that therapist-patient communications are privileged and cannot be revealed in court. The court emphasized that psychological counseling is important to the
determination of parental fitness. Consequently, the parents must
feel free to speak honestly. Often the exact nature of the disclosures
is unnecessary to the proper determination of custody. If this is the
case, then the doctor need testify only to the overall fitness of the
parents and need not relate specific facts revealed during counseling.
Because the doctor does not relate any of the parents' statements to
the court in such cases, there is no fear of incrimination and thus, the
Fifth Amendment protections are unnecessary.
Treating the therapist-patient relationship as privileged, however,
does not necessarily avoid Fifth Amendment problems. 128 The exact
scope of the privilege is often unclear, because there may be many
exceptions which operate in different circumstances. 129· Furthermore,
the privilege only prevents the therapist from taking the stand and
126
See generally William W. Patton, Note, The World VVhere Parallel Lines Converge: The
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Concurrent Civil and Criminal Child Abuse Proceedings, 24
GA. L. REv. 473, 510-23 (1990).
127
261 Cal. Rptr. 68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). This privilege is not thought to apply to
communications with a therapist during a court-ordered psychiatric evaluation. The court
in Eduardo distinguished between the two situations, citing the therapeutic purpose of the
counseling programs as opposed to the inquisitive purpose of the psychiatric evaluations.
Id. at 69-70.
128
It is beyond the scope of this Note to analyze the application of privilege in the
therapy context.
129
See, e.g., People v. Cabral, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 866 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that
when the defendant attempts to establish the existence of a therapeutic relationship, the
scope of the privilege will be interpreted narrowly). See also State v. Rupp. 614 So.2d 1323
(La. Ct. App. 1993) (concluding that the therapist-patient privilege does not apply in child
abuse prosecutions).
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testifying about the specific nature of the communications with the
patient. As evidenced by the holding in Tarasoff v. Regents of California, 130 a therapist may be required to reveal information gathered
during counseling if the patient's statements indicate that he is likely
to seriously injure a third party. 131 Privileging the therapist-client relationship does not necessarily prevent the recipient of the therapist's
information from testifying. Finally, if therapy is openly conditioned
upon the patient's admission of guilt, the therapist's certification of
the defendant's successful completion of the program may provide
grounds for a peijury charge. 132 Although this might not be enough
in all situations to convict on a peijury charge, it could give rise to a
reasonable fear of incrimination and thus trigger the protection of the
Fifth Amendment. The chances of the government charging a
defendant with peijury might not be overwhelmingly high, but the
opportunity for such a prosecution exists, and must be taken into account in determining the availability of t.he Fift.h Punendment
protections.

2.

The Minnesota Approach: No Coercion

The Minnesota Court of Appeals, in In re S.A. V., 133 acknowledged
the possibility of a subsequent criminal prosecution based on disclosures made in court-ordered therapy programs, but held that requiring a parent to cooperate with a psychological evaluation did not
violate the Fifth Amendment because there was no compulsion. The
court stated that "[t]ermination [of parental rights] in such a situation
is not, however, a sanction for exercise of a constitutional right, but
simply the necessary result of failure to rectify parental deficiencies."134 The court emphasized that the state had an interest in protecting the children and that the termination of parental rights is
551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
I d. It is it not unheard of for probation to be revoked as a result of incriminating
information acquired during therapy. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, reh'g
denied, 466 U.S. 945 (1984); see discussion infra part N.B.l. In a recent Arizona case, a
probationer invited his probation officer to join him during his weekly sex-offender therapy group. During the meeting he admitted to breaking into the homes of three women
and stealing their underwear. The probation officer, acting on the new information, instigated successful proceedings to revoke probation. News of the Weird, WASH. CnYPAPER, Oct.
10, 1993, at 16.
132 Although the exact nature of the communications would be privileged, the successful completion of a therapy program which required the defendant to admit guilt would
provide grounds for a peijury prosecution. The therapist could certify that the defendant
completed the program, and that the completion was premised on the defendant's admission of guilt.
133
392 N.W.2d 260 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
134
Jd. at 264. This is analogous to the Rylander Court's statement about the burden of
proof. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752. The Fifth Amendment silence cannot be used as a substitute for proving parental fitness. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
130
131
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merely a result of the parents' unsuitability. 135 In a later case, In re
JW, 136 the Minnesota Supreme Court refused to force parents toreveal specific evidence which could implicate them in a separate criminal proceeding. 137 The court noted that the state could, however,
compel the relevant testimony if it granted immunity. 1 3B This narrow
holding did not overrule the lower court case, but simply restricted
the court's ability to compel particular facts or explanations from the
parents in such situations.
Minnesota's approach, however, fails to evaluate appropriately
the extent of the Fifth Amendment's protections. First, the threat of
termination of parental rights is undoubtedly coercive. Furthermore,
even if the court cannot compel the parents to answer a specific inquiry, the risk of incrimination still exists-successful therapy would
require the parents to admit guilt and such evidence could be used to
bring criminal charges of child abuse.l 39 In such a circumstance, both
the real fear of incrimination and the presence of governmental coercion implicate the Fifth Amendment. The better approach is to weigh
the interests of the parents in avoiding incrimination against the
state's interest in protecting children. This is the approach that the
Vermont courts take to solve the problems which stem from the use of
therapy as a condition of family reunification.
3.

The Vermont Approach: Balancing

In State v. Mace, 140 the Vermont Supreme Court found that the
requirement that a defendant participate in therapy, as directed by his
therapist, was a condition "reasonably related to the rehabilitation of
[the] defendant and thus lies within the discretion of the court." 141
The court acknowledged that the situation implicated Fifth Amendment but balanced the interests involved and found that the protections did not apply in this case. Because the defendant pled guilty,
the court concluded that there was no fear of forcing an innocent
In re S.A. V., 392 N.W.2d at 264.
415 N.W.2d 879 (Minn. 1987).
137
Id. The trial court ordered the parents to explain the prior death of their nephew.
In reversing, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the parents were threatened with the
loss of their children and were penalized for exercising the privilege against self-incrimination. See also In reJ.G.W, 433 N.W.2d 885, 886 (Minn. 1989) ("[l]t is a violation of the
parent's fifth amendment privilege to directly require the parent to admit guilt as a part of
a court-ordered treatment plan .... [However,] the privilege does not protect the parent
from the consequences of any failure to succeed in a court-ordered treatment plan.").
138
In reJ.W., 415 N.W.2d at 884.
139
In this situation, the California approach might work. If the communications were
privileged, they could not be offered in court; only the therapist's general determination
of parental fitness would be admissible. The general certification would not be likely to
provide grounds for a prosecution for child abuse.
140
578 A.2d 104 (Vt. 1990).
141
Id. at 107.
135

136
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person to lie. Moreover, the program was designed to rehabilitate the
defendant through recognition of his abusive behavior, rather than to
subject him to further prosecution. Finally, the court reasoned that
the defendant's fears of a separate sexual abuse charge arising out of
acts discovered through therapy was not a realistic concern and thus
did not justify Fifth Amendment protection. 142
The Mace court's analysis is flawed in one respect: although it
may be unlikely that the state will use the evidence discovered in therapy to institute separate criminal proceedings, this does not dissipate
the fear of incrimination. Whether the state chooses not to initiate
further criminal charges speaks to the possibility of prosecution and
not to the possibility of incrimination. A parent's fear of incrimination is real and substantial, and therefore triggers the Fifth Amendment protections. The government cannot override the privilege
simply by later deciding not to prosecute after it has all the evidence.

4.

Interests of the Parties

In custody cases and in the plea bargaining context, courts have
applied a balancing test to determine the scope of the application of
the Fifth Amendment privilege in a particular situation. The government has a strong interest in protecting children. This interest, like
the independent regulatory interest in gathering evidence in civil proceedings, is unrelated to procuring a criminal conviction. 143 In Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight144 the Supreme Court
noted that:
VVhen a person assumes control over items that are the legitimate
object of the government's noncriminal regulatory powers, the ability to invoke the [Fifth Amendment] privilege is reduced ... Once
[a child is] adjudicated ... in need of assistance, his care and safety
[become] the particular object of the State's regulatory interests.1 45

142
!d. at 108. Additionally, in State v. Gleason, 576 A.2d 1246 (Vt. 1990), the Vermont
Supreme Court held that conditioning probation on participation in counseling was not
an abuse of discretion because the condition was reasonably related to the rehabilitation of
the defendant.
143
See discussion supra part II.B. I.
144
493 U.S. 549 (1990). For commentaries on the case, see Irene M. Rosenberg,
Bouknight: Of Abused Children and the Parental Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 76 IowA L.
REv. 535 (1991) (asserting that when there is a hybrid (civil and criminal) purpose behind
the production order, a court should balance the interests involved) and H. Bruce Dorsey,
Note, Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight: The Required Records Doctrine-Logic and Beyond, 50 Mo. L. REv. 446 (1991) (advocating the use of a balancing test).
145
Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 558-59. The court held the defendant in contempt for failure to produce her child. It decided that the Fifth Amendment was not implicated because the state requested production of the child for reasons related to his well-being and
not to gain information to be used in a criminal prosecution against the defendant.

722

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:700

Questioning parents about the abuse of their own children is relevant to determining whether they are fit parents. The inquiry serves
rehabilitative purposes, not punitive ones. Although information obtained during questioning may result in termination of custody, or
criminal prosecution, this is simply a logical consequence of the admission rather than an intended penalty. The applicability of the
Fifth Amendment protection turns on the primary purpose for the
proceeding. If the underlying purpose is to provide treatment or protection, rather than to impose punishment, then the Fifth Amendment privilege is limited. 146 This reasoning is similar to that used in
the "independent regulatory scheme" exception discussed earlier. 147
If the court phrases the condition in such a way that the requirement
is merely that the parents show their fitness or successfully complete
therapy, it should be considered constitutional. 148 If parents are specifically required to incriminate themselves, such a requirement
should violate the Fifth Amendment. When incrimination is merely a
by-product of the requirement of showing fitness, the state's interest
in protecting children may override the Fifth Amendment's protection against coercive pressures. These cases indicate a trend towards
recognizing the importance of therapy as a tool for rehabilitation and
the state's interest in promoting it.
The conflict between the state's interest and the Fifth Amendment in any of these cases can be avoided by granting immunity to the
parents from the use of their incriminating statements. 149 The
defendant in Bouknight was held in contempt for failure to produce
her child in response to a court order. 150 If the state had simply
granted immunity, the defendant could have produced the child with
no fear of incrimination. The holding is evidence of the Court's willingness to override Fifth Amendment protections, even when there
are alternatives available. It also may be evidence of the weight that
the Court accords to the government's interest in gathering evidence
for child abuse prosecutions.
In both the guilty plea and parental right termination cases,
courts have imposed some limitations on the scope of the Fifth
146
When the state's goal is rehabilitation, and not punishment, less weight should be
placed on procedural safeguards. See Allen v. Illinois, 4 78 U.S. 364 ( 1986). Allen dealt with
the issue of whether proceedings to declare a defendant a "sexually dangerous person"
were criminal within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 365. Noting the rehabilitative purpose behind the proceedings, id. at 370, the Court held that such proceedings
were essentially civil actions and that the process did not require application of the Fifth
Amend~ent safeguards. ld. at 374-75. In so deciding, the Court weighed governmental
and individual interests. See id. at 372-75.
147 See discussion supra part II.B.l.
148
See discussion supra part III.B.2.
149 The immunity statutes would reach these situations.
150
Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 549.
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Amendment by balancing the constitutional protections against the
needs of the criminal justice system. Although these two preconviction situations may be unique, both are evidence that the privilege is
not absolute. These situations also demonstrate the appropriateness
of using a balancing test to determine the extent of the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination in the postconviction context when the government's interest in rehabilitation is more
pronounced.

N
BALANCING THE FIFTH AMENDMENT IN THE
PosTSENTENCING CoNTEXT

The Fifth Amendment is not absolute; the courts have weakened
its prohibition on compelling a defendant to inculpate himself. For

example, the absence of immunity for prosecutions for perjury shows
that a state's interest in promoting truthfulness outweighs the Fifth
Amendment privilege. Additionally, the legitimate regulatory interest
exception allows the government to compel information when it has a
strong public need. 151 The custodial interrogation exception has
been limited to the police context. 152 Furthermore, the acceptability
of guilty pleas recognizes that the need for official leniency when a
defendant imparts a substantial benefit to the state outweighs an individual's interest in avoiding coercive pressures.
The Fifth Amendment privilege is not absolute prior to conviction, and it should not be considered absolute after conviction. This
Note proposes a two step analysis for Fifth Amendment questions, one
which is similar to the two part due process test articulated by the
Supreme Court in Matthews v. Eldridge. 153 First, a court should determine whether the Fifth Amendment is triggered, for example,
whether there is a real fear of incrimination and governmental compulsion. Second, if so, the court should determine whether a constitutional violation occurred. In order to answer the second question in
the postsentencing context, courts should apply a balancing test as the
Supreme Court did in Matthews.I54
151
152

See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra part II.B.2.

424 u.s. 319 (1976).
!d. It is important to acknowledge that the text of the Fifth Amendment does not
explicitly support this two step analysis. Unlike the Fourth Amendment, which has a builtin reasonableness inquiry in that a court first determines whether there was a warrantless
search or seizure and then applies a reasonableness test to determine whether the Amendment has been violated, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is absolute on its face. Ali noted above, however, application of the amendment's protections by
the courts has not been absolute. As with the Fourth Amendment, a court must first decide whether the Fifth Amendment protections apply. Second, the court should apply a
153
154
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The balancing test proposed here recognizes the need for procedural protections, yet it does not undermine the efficacy of rehabilitative programs. This Note does not set out the exact weight to accord
each consideration but merely defines the parameters that the courts
should consider in interpreting a universal test. The following section
first provides a background on probationary conditions and then discusses two cases which identify important factors to be considered in
balancing. It then identifies the factors that should be balanced to
determine the application of the Fifth Amendment in the postsentencing context. Finally, this section applies the test to two recent
Supreme Court cases.
Balancing Relevant Conditions of Probation and Fifth
Amendment Protections

A.

The criminal justice system assumes that a verdict is correct and it
does not provide a sentencing alternative for those who are wrongly
convicted beyond the regular avenues of direct appeal and habeas
corpus. Probation is not a means for wrongly convicted defendant's
to escape jail, but is instead a form of punishment which is less severe
than incarceration. It allows a state to avoid imprisoning defendants
who do not present a threat to society. A person placed on probation,
therefore, is presumed guilty. Although she retains certain constitutional rights, her rights must be balanced against the requirements of
an effective criminal justice system.
1.

The Federal Probation Act and the 1984 Sentencing Refonn Act

The Federal Probation Act authorizes courts to impose probation
or suspend a defendant's sentence for crimes committed before November 1, 1987. 155 Conditions of probation must not be more stringent than necessary for effective rehabilitation and protection of the
public. 156 Probation may be revoked at any time for the violation of a
condition of probation, or for events which occurred before the probationary period started. 157 Thus, a perjury conviction resulting from
false testimony given before the probation was effective would be
balancing test to determine the extent of the constitutional protection-whether the individual's interest outweighs the government's interest.
155
18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982) (repealed 1984, but effective for crimes committed before
November 1, 1987). See generally Beth M. Elfrey, Project, Probation, Twentieth Annual Review
of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1989-90, 79 CEO. L.J.
1149 (1991) (discussing both the provisions and judicial treatment of the Act).
156
Elfrey, supra note 155, at 1161.
157
Id. at 1162.
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grounds for terminating the probation and reinstating the
sentence. 158
The 1984 Sentencing Reform Act replaced the Federal Probation
Act and is in effect for all crimes committed after November I,
1987. 159 The 1984 act differs from the Federal Probation Act in several respects. First, the new act provides clear guidelines for imposing
probation. 160 Second, the act allows courts to impose conditions of
probation "reasonably related to the nature and circumstances of the
offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, and the goals
of sentencing." 161 Additionally, a court may modify the conditions at
any time during probation following a hearing. 162 Like the Federal
Probation Act, the Sentencing Reform Act allows a court to revoke
probation for any violation during the probationary period, and permits the court to reinstate the original sentence, impose a new sentence or provide additional conditions of probation. 163 Although the
act substantially clarifies the guidelines for imposing probationary
conditions, it does not end the Fifth Amendment inquiry. The constitutionality of certain conditions of probation and the permissibility of
specific inquiries remain at issue. The next subsection sets out a test
which analyzes the relationship between conditions of probation and
the protections of the Fifth Amendment.

2.

Balancing Considerations: Legitimate Goals and Relevant
Inquiries

In United States v. Pierce, 164 the Ninth Circuit held that a condition
of probation requiring a defendant to reveal financial information
does not violate the Fifth Amendment. 165 In determining that the
condition promoted the rehabilitative goals of the Federal Probation
Act, the court relied on a test articulated in United States v. ConsueloGonzalez.166 In Consuelo-Gonzalez the Ninth Circuit held that a probationer is not considered to have voluntarily waived his Fifth Amendment privilege with regard to specific probation conditions merely
158
See, e.g., United States v. Stehl, 665 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1981) (probation revocation
proceeding followed peijury conviction).
159 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559, 3561-3566, 3571-3674, 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988). See
generally Elfrey, supra note 155, at 1149-59 (discussing both the provisions and judicial treatment of the 1984 act); Wendy R. Willis, Project, Probation, Twenty-second Annual Review of
Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals, GEO. LJ. 1491, 1496
(1993).
160 Elfrey, supra note 155, at 1149.
161
Willis, supra note 159, at 1493.
162 Jd. at 1494.
163 Jd. at 1495-96. Probation revocation proceedings are governed by rules of criminal
procedure. FED. R. CruM. P. 32.1.
164 561 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978).
165
Jd.
166 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975) (en bane).
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because he failed either to assert the right, or to object at the sentencing.167 The Pierce court noted that "[a]s a practical matter, a defendant's consent to a probation condition is likely to be nominal where
consent is given only to avoid imprisonment."I6s However, this does
not end the inquiry. Although Fifth Amendment claims may not be
extinguished with regard to a specific probationary condition, this
does not mean that the privilege applies to all situations. The Pierce
court applied the Consuelo-Gonzalez balancing test to establish whether
the condition was justified by the needs of rehabilitation. 169
The Consuelo-Gonzalez test examines three elements in determining whether a condition is reasonably related to the purposes of
probation:
( 1) the purposes sought to be sel\fed by probation;
(2) the extent to which constitutional rights enjoyed by law-abiding citizens should be accorded to probationers;
(3) the legitimate needs of law enforcement. 170

These factors balance the rehabilitative interest of imposing probation
and the constitutional protection of the Fifth Amendment. This approach has had considerable influence. Several courts have adopted
this balancing approach, 171 and the Sentencing Reform Act codified
its elements, thereby permitting courts to balance the relevant interests when setting conditions of probation. 172
In Asherman v. Meachum 173 the Second Circuit used a balancing
analysis to determine that the revocation of a prisoner's home release
status for failure to answer relevant questions did not violate the Fifth
Amendment. The court noted that "public agencies retain the authority to ask questions relevant to their public responsibilities and to
take adverse action against those whose refusal to answer impedes the
discharge of those responsibilities." 174 The Second Circuit also noted
167
168

!d. at 265.
Pierce, 561 F.2d at 739 (citing Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d at 274 (Wright, J.,
dissenting)).
169 !d., at 739-40.
170 Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d at 262.
171 See, e.g., United States v. Stine, 646 F.2d 839, 842-43 (3d Cir. 1981) (upholding the
revocation of probation for a defendant who violated a condition requiring psychological
treatment and implicitly accepting the Consuelo-Gonzalez balancing test); United States v.
Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 147-48 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing Consuelo-Gonzalez and holding that a
condition of probation must be "reasonably related to rehabilitation of the probationer,
protection of the pubic against other offenses during its term, deterrence of future misconduct by the probationer or general deterrence of others, condign punishment, or some
combination of these objectives"); cf Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330,333 (lOth Cir. 1971)
(holding in a case predating Consuelo-Gonzalez that conditions of probation must have "a
reasonable relationship to the treatment of the accused and the protection of the public").
172 See supra notes 159-63 and accompanying notes.
173 957 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1992) (en bane).
174 !d. at 982.
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that Asherman was penalized not for the exercise of his constitutional
rights, but for "failure to answer a relevant inquiry." 175 Asherman's
parole was revoked due to his failure to abide by the condition requiring a psychiatric examination, not simply due to his silence. Because
the state needed to conduct a psychiatric examination to establish the
defendant's fitness for parole, Asherman's failure to respond to questions resulted in the need to employ alternative options. Because parole was not a viable alternative, the state had no other option than to
revoke Asherman's home release and to incarcerate him.
The distinction between the consequences that follow the failure
to answer a relevant inquiry and punishment for the assertion of Fifth
Amendment rights forces courts to balance the needs of the criminal
justice system against the constitutional protections. It is impermissible for a court to increase a criminal's sentence or to revoke probation merely because the defendant invokes the Fifth Amendment. 176
If, however, the criminal refuses to answer a relevant inquiry177 that is
rationally related to the goals of incarceration or probation, then the
defendant's interest in remaining silent should be balanced against
the interests of the state and the requirements of the criminal system.
When the balance tilts in favor of the government, making the
defendant choose (between waiving the privilege and thus receiving
certain benefits, such as probation instead of incarceration, or asserting the privilege and facing the consequences he would have had to
face had probation not been available in the first place) is not unconstitutionaJ.l78 In such cases, the failure to assert the privilege should
be deemed a voluntary waiver.
In any case a court should first determine whether the Fifth
Amendment applies at all. The court may then determine the extent
of the Fifth Amendment protection. In the postconviction context, a
court should consider the following: the legitimacy of the government's purpose, with effectuating rehabilitation being a more legiti175 Jd. at 983. The court emphasized that the questioner did not express interest in
using the statements in a later criminal proceeding. Id. The court appeared to draw a
distinction based on the focus of the proceeding. Here, the commissioner was not trying to
amass evidence for a later criminal proceeding; instead he was attempting to ascertain the
appropriateness of Asherman's home release status.
176 Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 278 ( 1968).
177 The protections of the Fifth Amendment do not fail before every relevant inquiry.
For example, when a police officer asks a suspect specific questions about a crime, that
inquiry is relevant to the government's interest in maintaining law and order. The Fifth
Amendment, however, applies in full force. A court must consider the purpose behind the
inquiry. Gathering evidence for a criminal trial is not a legitimate goal permitting compulsion under the Fifth Amendment. See supra part II.A. Alternatively, compelling answers to
facilitate rehabilitation is a legitimate goal. Id. Even so, the court must balance the interests involved and the defendant must be allowed the choice of whether to answer or not.
178 See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971) ("[T)he Constitution does not
... always forbid requiring [a defendant] to choose.").
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mate goal than coercing a confession; the relevance of the condition
to a legitimate goal of the state; and the individual's interest in the
protection, which depends on the probability that the government
will bring a subsequent prosecution based on the incriminating statements. None of these considerations is determinative; each situation
should be evaluated on its own facts. Nor should this list be considered exhaustive. Additional considerations may include whether
there are viable alternatives to the particular rehabilitation program
or whether the state can grant immunity. This flexible approach
should avoid the need for narrow exceptions to the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. Instead, courts should decide
cases on an individual basis, taking into account many different factors, not least of which is the importance of rehabilitative programs.
B.

Application of the Balancing Test

The following subsections apply the proposed balancing test to
two recent Supreme Court cases. In each case, the lower court had
imposed a general condition of probation that conflicted with the
Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. Because in
both cases the conditions were relevant to the rehabilitation of the
convicted criminal and were necessary to achieve goals of the criminal
justice system, the interests of both the state and the defendants
should be weighed. Consequently, in both cases this Note concludes
that interests of the state outweigh those of the defendants.
1.

Condition of Truth-Minnesota v. Murphy

In Minnesota v. Murphy, 179 the defendant claimed that a condition
of probation requiring him to speak truthfully to his probation officer
violated the Fifth Amendment. Mter pleading guilty to a sex offense,
Murphy was given a suspended sentence and placed on probation. 180
During the course of court-ordered therapy, the probationer told his
therapist about a previous rape and murder he had committed. The
therapist contacted Murphy's probation officer, who arranged a meeting with Murphy and questioned him about the incident. 181 Murphy
voluntarily admitted the crime. The probation officer related the in179
465 U.S. 420 (1984). SeegenerallyShelbyWebb,Jr., Note, Constitutional Law-Warning to Probationers: Admissions Made to Your Probation Officer Without Prior Warning Can Be Used
Against You in a Subsequent Criminal Proceeding-Minnesota v. Murphy, 28 How. LJ. 355
(1985) (arguing that Murphy substantially clarifies the contours of a probationer's constitu~
tiona! rights).
180
Murphy, 465 U.S. at 422.
181
ld. at 423 n.l. This is a good example of a situation in which privileging the communications between the therapist and the client did not work. Although the therapist
could not testifY in court about his knowledge, he was not barred from informing the
probation officer. See discussion supra part III. B. I.
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criminating information to the police, who issued a warrant for Murphy's arrest. 182 As mentioned earlier, 183 a probation revocation
proceeding is not considered a criminal prosecution; thus, any statements made by a probationer can be used to demonstrate a violation
of a condition of probation. 184 The state used Murphy's statements,
however, not only to revoke his probation, but also to prosecute him
subsequent to the revocation proceeding. 1 B5
The Court found that Murphy had voluntarily waived his Fifth
Amendment protection and that he had been under no compulsion
to speak. 186 Additionally, the Court failed to find any of the exceptions which grant automatic immunity: Murphy would not have incriminated himselfby simply claiming the right; 187 a conversation with
a probation officer under these circumstances is not considered a custodial interrogation; 188 and he had not been threatened with a penalty for remaining silent. 189 The Court emphasized, however, that "if
the State, either expressly or by implication, asserts that invocation of
the privilege would lead to revocation of the probation, it would have
created the classic penalty situation." 1 9°
The majority dismissed Murphy's claim that the confidence inspired by the probation officer and that Murphy's possible fear of revocation of his probation led him to volunteer information he would
not have offered had he been apprised of his rights. 191 Dissenting,
Justice Marshall argued that the state presented Murphy with the
"Hobson's choice, of incriminating himself or suffering a penalty." 192
Because the threat to revoke probation was coercive and no Miranda
warnings were given, Justice Marshall would have automatically immunized Murphy's statements from use in a future prosecution.1 93
The application of a balancing test would avoid this conflict between the majority and dissent by acknowledging that the Fifth
Amendment protections are triggered but weighing their application
Murphy, 465 U.S. at 423-24.
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
184
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
185
Murphy, 465 U.S. at 425.
186
Jd. at 429.
187
Jd. at 439-40.
188
Jd. at 431.
189
Jd. at 439.
190 Jd. at 435. In a footnote clarifying this statement, the Court noted that the Fifth
Amendment would not apply if compliance with the condition would not pose a realistic
threat of incrimination-if, for example, the condition were merely a residential restriction, or a limitation on travel. Furthermore, in dicta, the Court noted that a state could
compel a probationer to answer even incriminating questions as long as it provided immunity from future criminal prosecution. /d. at 437 n.7.
191
Jd. at 431-33.
192 Id. at 443 (Marshall,]., dissenting).
193 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
182
183
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against the state's interest in effective probation. The threat of probation revocation may influence a defendant's willingness to offer information. However, because the requirement of truthfulness was a
legitimate condition of Murphy's probation and was not designed to
present him with an unconstitutional choice, Murphy was not entitled
to automatic immunity.
Both the majority and dissent emphasized the distinction between questions pertaining to the original prosecution and questions
about a different crime. 194 As to the former, the Fifth Amendment
right to remain silent is extinguished after a final conviction. 195 The
protections remain available, however, in the latter inquiries. 196 The
condition involved here was a general one which merely required
Murphy to be truthful to his probation officer; it did not require him
to disclose specific incriminating incidents. Such conditions are relevant to the government's interest in promoting successful probation
and rehabilitation. The probationary relationship, like the therapeutic relationship, is premised on trust. In order for the probation officer to be as effective as possible, the defendant must be truthfuL
This does not mean that the defendant cannot remain silent; but if he
speaks he must not lie. Murphy, for example, could have remained
silent without violating his probation. Ultimately, the state's interest
in promoting truthfulness outweighed the defendant's interest in
avoiding coercive pressures. 197 Therefore, Murphy's failure to assert
the privilege was appropriately considered a voluntary waiver.
2.

Condition of Successful Completion of Therapy-State v. Imlay 198

Imlay, like Murphy, stood trial and was found guilty. Unlike Murphy, however, Imlay asserted the Fifth Amendment privilege during
therapy and claimed that he was penalized for his silence. During the
trial he voluntarily testified and maintained his innocence. 199 Therefore, the requirement that Imlay admit guilt as part of a therapy program presented a real fear that he might face criminal prosecution for
perjury. As noted earlier, there is no protection for perjured state-

ld. at 426, 441 (Marshall,]., dissenting).
See discussion supra part II.A.l.
196
See discussion supra part II.A.l.
197
This is consistent with the failure of the immunity statutes to cover prosecutions for
perjury. The constitutional protection is not interpreted to allow false testimony. See discussion supra part II.A.
198
813 P.2d 979 (Mont. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1260, cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct.
444 (1992).
199
Id. at 985.
194
l 95
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ments. 200 Therefore, in contrast to the parental reunification cases,201
the state could not have immunized Imlay's statements in order to
compel answers. 202 Because there is no protection for false statements, if Imlay were forced to admit guilt he could be charged with
peijuring himself in the earlier proceeding.
Even when there is a real fear of incrimination, the Fifth Amendment is not available absent governmental compulsion. 203 Here, as in
the plea bargaining situation, the defendant faces a choice. The Constitution "does not forbid 'every government-imposed choice in the
criminal process that has the effect of discouraging the exercise of
constitutional rights.' "204 Montana did not force Imlay to admit his
guilt; it merely provided him with a means of rehabilitation which he
could have chosen not to accept. 205 As one state court noted, "[e]ven
if the requirement of admission of guilt ... impinged on Fifth Amendment rights, the inmate is not compelled to incriminate himself because the inmate may choose not to participate in t..h.e program." 206
Additionally, in Bordenkircher v. Hayes207 the Supreme Court, examining plea bargains, stated that "there is no such element of punishment
or retaliation so long as the accused is free to accept or reject [an offer
ofadifferentsentence]." 208 The state's goal is not to force those innocent of the crimes for which they have been convicted to peijure
themselves during therapy. Instead, the intention of the state is to
help guilty criminals accept responsibility for their actions and also to
prevent recidivism. The choice between probation and incarceration
involves governmental compulsion; few would choose confinement in
200
See discussion supra part II.A. But cf. Scott M. Solkoff, Note, Judicial Use Immunity
and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Court Mandated Therapy Programs, 17 NovA L.
REv. 1441 (1993) (advocating the application of judicial use immunity in the Imlay
context).
201
See discussion supra part III.B.
202
Immunity is only effective if the defendant is protected from all later criminal prosecutions stemming from the compelled testimony.
203
See discussion supra part II.B.
204 Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 236 (1980) (quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe,
412 U.S. 17, 30 (1973) ). jenkins recognized the importance of considering the legitimacy
of the challenged governmental practice in determining whether a constitutional right has
been impermissibly burdened. Id. at 238.
205
The goal in this situation is to help the defendant, rather than to amass evidence
for another criminal prosecution. In Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986), the Court distinguished between statutes that aim to provide treatment and those that aim to define
criminal activities. The former are civil in nature and thus do not invoke the protections of
the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 375. In such a situation, the purpose of eliciting the defendant's admission of guilt is to provide treatment, not to label him a criminal or to prosecute
him for peijury.
206
Henderson v. State, 543 So.2d 344, 346 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that
conditioning the early release of a sex offender upon his satisfactory participation in a
therapy program did not violate the Fifth Amendment).
207
434 u.s. 357 (1978).
208
Id. at 363.
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a cell over the relative freedom offered by probation. Such compulsion, however, does not always rise to the level of constitutional infirmity. Rather than asserting that the Fifth Amendment is not triggered
in these situations, it is more accurate to admit the presence of the
evils against which the constitutional privilege seeks to protect. The
analysis should not end there, however. Once a court establishes that
the Fifth Amendment is triggered, it should then ask whether it is
appropriate to apply its protections. The court should do this by balancing the interests of the criminal against those of the state.
The state has a strong interest in rehabilitating criminals through
therapy and probation. First, the purpose of therapy is to provide
treatment, not to punish; its use stems from society's interest in rehabilitation. The therapist is not a law enforcement officer and has no
power to detain a patient who is unwilling to participate. Therapists
strive to create a supportive environment in which people can feel
comfortable talking about their problems. Under no circumstances
would a competent therapist threaten a patient. Second, acceptance
of responsibility is a necessary condition of therapy. 209 Third, rehabilitation is a legitimate goal of law enforcement210 and this goal requires effective therapy programs. As the American Professional
Society on the Abuse of Children noted in its amicus brief in Imlay:
Effective treatment depends on cooperation between treatment
professionals and the criminal justice system, particularly courts and
probation and parole officials. The courts play a critical role by
mandating participation in treatment as a condition of probation or
parole. Court-ordered treatment provides an important external
motivator for offenders to enter and remain in treatment. 211

Finally, it is unlikely that the government will prosecute the probationer for perjury based on incriminating statements made during
therapy. 212
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 46 (1978). Although this Note focuses on
the rehabilitative goals of the criminal justice system, there are other interests that may
conflict with the Fifth Amendment's protections. This Note does not intend to suggest
that all such considerations should trump the privilege. It is important, however, to recognize some of the cases which have focused on other goals. See, e.g., McGuatha, 402 U.S. at
217 (per curiam) (holding that the privilege was not violated by the state requirement that
a jury determine guilt and punishment in the same proceeding and stating that the policies behind the amendment were "not offended when a defendant in a capital case yields
to the pressure to testify on the issue of punishment at the risk of damaging his case on
guilt"); United States v. Dunnigan, 113 S. Ct. 1111 (1993) (holding that the government's
interest in appropriate punishment permits a court to increase a defendant's sentence
when he or she commits willful peijury during the trial).
211
APSAC Brief, supra note 2, at 8-9.
212
Peijury charges are generally difficult to prove, and thus the government does not
often choose to expend its limited resources on such prosecutions. In the therapy context,
209

210
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The state's interests in fostering individual responsibility and rehabilitation outweigh Imlay's interest in avoiding self-incrimination.
The requirement of therapy programs that a person accept responsibility is indispensable to their rehabilitative goal. Additionally, a person in Imlay's situation may still choose whether or not to comply with
the condition of probation. Although he may still appeal his verdict,
he may not use the Fifth Amendment to shield him from the punishment legally imposed for his crime. He may, in effect, choose his punishment, whether it be probation and therapy or incarceration.
Because a probationer's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is not violated even if his probation is revoked, the balance favors allowing the condition.
CoNCLUSION

There is no consensus on the application of the Fifth Amendment protections in postsentencing situations. Montana v. Imlay provided the Supreme Court with an opportunity to clarify the operation
of the privilege in this context. For procedural reasons, the Court
chose not to take advantage of the opportunity. 213 The implications
of the Montana Supreme Court opinion, holding that the court-ordered sex-offender program violated the Fifth Amendment, may be
profound. If therapy programs are no longer used for fear of impinging on criminals' Fifth Amendment rights, the use of rehabilitative
sentencing alternatives, such as probation, will likely decline.
As prison populations increase, we need realistic and appropriate
alternatives to incarceration. Rehabilitat,i_on through probation and
therapy offers a sound alternative. Therapy programs are a traditional
form of psychological treatment and generally are not unusually intrusive. Furthermore, concerns that therapy is ineffective in the correctional setting because of the inherently coercive atmosphere 214 are
less forceful in the probationary context. It therefore becomes important to retain such programs as part of the probation scheme, lest
rehabilitative operations disappear entirely from the criminal system.
Therapy is an ideal rehabilitation-focused alternative. If courts cannot
impose reasonable conditions to ensure compliance with therapy programs, however, this alternative may well disappear.
The procedural safeguards of the Fifth Amendment recognize
the criminal system's fallibility. Although the emphasis on perfecting
the means of separating the guilty from the innocent is justifiable, it
should not undermine procedures used to achieve other goals of the
the state is likely to be more concerned with rehabilitating the offender than with obtaining another conviction.
213
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
214
See, e.g., Veneziano, supra note 10, at 141.
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system such as punishment and rehabilitation. The protections must
be balanced against the overall objective of the criminal legal system-to insure the safety of our society by providing a means for both
punishment and rehabilitation. Therapy programs, which force an offender to accept responsibility for his actions and work toward avoiding recidivism, provide one of the best means to effectuate this latter
goal.
jessica Wilen Bergf
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